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Reframing Narratives of State building in Africa: 





One of the most unstable regions of the continent for decades, West Africa is slowly 
recovering from years of civil wars and/or severe crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and most recently Mali and Guinea-Bissau. The emphasis on 
peace building and, more broadly, state building, has therefore never been more 
pressing. These crises, which by ripple effect spared no West African state, raise 
important questions about fundamental governance issues and, more specifically, 
about how national emergencies are managed. Of course, this is even more relevant 
to states that have experienced protracted violent armed conflicts as a result of state 
building efforts that have gone awry.  This only highlights the intimate connection, 
indeed the dialectic between a peace building process necessitated by a civil war 
ending and state, and nation-state building in which African states have engaged 
since their independence. The serious conflicts and, in cases such as Cote d’Ivoire, 
the complete breakdown in the form of a brutal civil war, are invariably the result of 
this uncharted state building process and the many challenges it entails.  States that 
fell into the latter category abound.  However, even among the intriguing case 
studies they present of the complete breakdown model, Cote d’Ivoire stands as a 
most fascinating illustration of the complexity of state/nation building as well as its 
interconnections with devastating conflict and with peace building.  
 
This study is about exploring these relationships and their mutually reinforcing 
attributes in the context of national politics in Africa. Its purpose is to answer a 
number of related questions. The most critical of these is: To what extent, do 
particular forms of peace settlements lead to sustainable peace and state building?  
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In other words, what forms of political settlements have demonstrated potential for 
success or sustainability in terms of peace building and state building? 
 
Subsidiary, but equally compelling questions to answer include: Who are the main 
actors in the processes of peace building and state building? How much has Cote 
d’Ivoire made use of the opportunity of its ‘second-chance’ to address fundamental 
issues of governance? To what extent have agreements reached after conflicts 
brought credible long-term peace?  
In addition to what socio-political and economic dynamics led to the outbreak of 
civil war, this study is thus also about critically examining the process by which 
conflict was brought to an end and whether durable peace was achieved. 
 
Since the study is built around the concept of state building process as ongoing 
‘national conversations’, it takes a detailed look at the process of peace building and 
state building in Cote d’Ivoire with special focus on the periods where the national 
conversations took an ever worsening turn with the 1999 military coup, the 2002 
civil war and the 2010 post electoral crisis. This baseline study focuses on three 
main issues as interrelated and central to understanding peace building and state 
building processes in Cote d’Ivoire. These are: (i) Political power: the deep historical 
roots of succession controversies and long standing elite competition over the 
control of the postcolonial state; (ii) The resentment resource scarcity and the 
challenges of sustainable and equitable economic development, economic 
downturns, and regional disparities created overtime; (iii) Identity and power: the 
concept of ‘Ivoirité’ and its impact on issues of citizenship in Cote d’Ivoire. This 
study posits that these three interconnected issues have been the underlying basis 
of state building ‘dialogues’ that have taken place in Cote d’Ivoire at least since 
independence, and consequently affected state building and eventually peace 
building processes over the years. Whether the tentative peace achieved since April 
2011 with the end of the post electoral crisis endures will depend on the extent to 
which these issues are appropriately addressed during the ongoing conversations. 
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This Baseline study consists of five parts: First, it provides an historical background 
of Cote d’Ivoire socio-political trajectory by focusing on the various state building 
conversations that took place before the outbreak of the armed conflict; second, it 
analyses the civil conflict, concentrating on its various root causes, triggers and 
actors involved; third, it interrogates the issues surrounding the peace process and 
the different actors involved in the ‘conversations’ on peace building and state 
building; Fourth, it outlines the outcomes that emerged from the peace and state 
building processes whilst extracting the lessons learned from Cote d’Ivoire’s 
particular context and experience. Finally, the fifth section identifies which 
propositions are to be empirically tested during the field research. 
 
Historical Background: The evolution of the state in Cote d’Ivoire 
 
Despite being unusual in the West African region, Cote d’Ivoire did share similarities 
with its West African neighbours. Indeed, the country also had artificial borders, its 
economy was highly dependent on primary exports and it was severely affected by 
external shocks. Despite these setbacks, the country remained stable despite the 
outbreak of violence across the region. Cote d’Ivoire stood out from its neighbours 
for so long precisely because its economic success went hand in hand with its 
political stability. Indeed, in the early 80s, the country was one of the few on the 
continent with a civilian regime having avoided the military takeover curse. Another 
significant difference from its neighbours was its legacy of French colonialism, 
which established more direct rule than British colonialism. France maintained 
close ties with the Ivorian elites and remained very much involved in its economy 
even after independence. This close relationship was also significant in the country’s 
political troubles as France played a major role in the country’s economy and 
politics throughout its history. There is thus much to be learned from the evolution 
of the state of Cote d’Ivoire and an important first step is to present its pre-colonial 
and colonial history. 
What is known currently as the territory of Cote d’Ivoire is a creation of France’s 
imperial conquest in West Africa, with the territory officially becoming a French 
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colony in 1893. Prior to that first colonial rule there was no centralized authority 
governing the vast area and its inhabitants.1 The northern and southern areas of 
Cote d’Ivoire underwent very different historical processes. This was largely for 
geographical reasons, where the north was within the reach of the Sudanic empires, 
while the dense forest of the south prevented extensive political organisation.2 
There were six main political formations: the Malinke Empire of the Toure in the 
Odienne Region; the Kingdom of Kong of the Ouattarra Dynasty, in the North; in the 
East, the Agni-Ashanti Kingdoms of Bondoukou, Indenie and Krindjbo; and in Baoule 
Country the Sakasso Kingdom.3 What is important to note is that like many other 
political formations across the continent, these were autonomous and evolving at 
their own pace when that natural evolution was cut short, often violently, by 
colonial superimposition of foreign political, military, and cultural rule. This 
superimposition of alien agendas and methods was to have serious damaging 
consequences for the state building conversationS that were to emerge over time. 
 
In 1895 Cote d'Ivoire was made a constituent unit of the Federation of French West 
Africa and remained so until 1958. It was a colony and an overseas territory under 
the French Third Republic. Until the period following World War II, governmental 
affairs in French West Africa were administered from Paris. Most of its colonies, 
including Cote d’Ivoire, were highly hierarchical in nature and were subdivided into 
Cercles, Subdivisions and Cantons that were administered by their respective heads. 
The colonial infrastructure made indigenous leaders (chiefs and kings) chef de 
Cantons, and this eventually eroded their legitimacy,4  as bestowed by tradition.  
France's policy in West Africa was reflected mainly in its philosophy of ‘association’, 
meaning that all Africans in Cote d'Ivoire were officially French ‘subjects’ but really 
without any rights to citizenship or representation in Africa or France as the 
population was marginalized and excluded from any decision making process, 
particularly the future of the territory. The later stages of colonial rule saw the rise 
of the Ivorian educated elite and its urban middle class. This also saw the rise, in the 
1940s, of young leader Felix Houphouet-Boigny and his party, the Parti 
Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire-Rassemblement Democratique Africain (PDCI-RDA). A 
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chef de canton and planter, Mr. Houphouet-Boigny went on to become a minister in 
French governments and play a major role in Franco-African politics between World 
War II and the independence era. Cote d'Ivoire became an autonomous republic 
within the French community in 1958 as a result of a referendum that brought 
community status to all members of the old Federation of French West Africa 
(except Guinea, which had voted against association). Cote d'Ivoire became 
independent on August 7, 1960 and Felix Houphouet-Boigny assumed the 
presidency.5 Cote d'Ivoire's contemporary political evolution is a direct result of 
Houphouet-Boigny's 33-year presidency. His vision and leadership also heavily 
influenced the state building conversations that emerged and shaped Cote d’Ivoire 
as we know it. The post-colonial state inherited most of the administrative and 
bureaucratic infrastructures of the French colonial state and its ties to France 
remained markedly strong. 
 
As mentioned above, in a region where many political systems were unstable, Cote 
d'Ivoire showed remarkable political stability, which lasted from its independence 
from France in 1960 until 1999. Felix Houphouet-Boigny remained President until 
his death on December 7, 1993, and Cote d'Ivoire maintained a close political 
allegiance to France and to the West more generally. Following his death, Henri 
Konan Bédié succeeded him until 1999. Henri Konan Bédié presidency struggled 
due to a combination of factors. The country was hit by fluctuating world market 
prices for cocoa and coffee (its prime export) as well increased debt and steep 
reductions in foreign aid in 1998 and 1999. His presidency started with a succession 
crisis and political tensions against the background of sharpening rhetoric around 
identity and the eligibility of Alassane Dramane Ouattara who run the country as 
Prime Minister while Houphouet-Boigny was ailing. It should be noted that there 
were also recurring mutinies in the army. These factors combined to culminate in 
the country's first coup on December 24, 1999.6 The coup only signalled the impasse 





After thirty-nine years of political stability Cote d’Ivoire succumbed to its numerous 
contradictions caused by the strains of state building. Following the bloodless coup, 
General Robert Guei formed a new government of national unity and promised to 
hold open elections.7 A different state was being shaped as a new constitution was 
drafted and ratified by the population in 2000. However, this new phase in the 
Ivorian state building process was to be significant in leading to the ensuing conflict. 
Amid political tensions and various plots and coup attempts, a new constitution was 
drafted.  It established rigid eligibility requirements for contesting political office, 
including that both parents of anyone wishing to run for president must be born in 
Cote d’Ivoire.8  Widely believed to be aimed at barring Mr. Ouattara from being able 
to run for office, the articles incriminated accentuated national divisions between 
North and South, and between Christians and Muslims. 
 
Through what turned out to be turbulent and generally unfair elections in 2000, 
Laurent Gbagbo (the leader Front Populaire Ivoirien - FPI), the only major candidate 
allowed to run, became president, but only after violent demonstrations by Gbagbo 
to denounce Guei’s attempt to confiscate power. Alassane Ouattara, the leader of the 
Rassemblement des Republicaines (RDR) and Guei himself eventually called for peace 
and recognized Gbagbo as president. The country would experience another bout of 
violence in 2001 with another coup attempt but despite the many challenges 
President Gbagbo formed a government of national unity that included the RDR 
party in August 2002. However, in September 2002 exiled military personnel and 
co-conspirators in Abidjan attacked government and military facilities in Abidjan, 
Bouake, and Korhogo. Almost immediately after the coup attempt, the government 
launched an aggressive security operation, in which shantytowns occupied by 
thousands of immigrants and Ivoirians were searched for weapons and rebels. 
Government security forces burned down or demolished a number of these 
shantytowns, which displaced over 12,000 people9. The coup evolved rapidly into a 
full-scale rebellion, which split the country in two, and escalated into the country's 
worst crisis since independence in 1960.  The civil war that was to ensue decisively 
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changed the terms of state building conversations.  It added the layer of efforts to 
achieve peace first, before those conversations could unfold.  
 
Three main actors, the rebel groups, the Patriotic Movement of Cote d’Ivoire (MPCI), 
the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for 
Justice and Peace (MJP), marched against the Gbagbo regime,10  and became the 
newest interlocutors in the new conversations.  These rebel movements soon came 
to control the northern half of the country. Even though a ceasefire was agreed to, 
the country continued to experience sporadic violence.11 
 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened by placing 
approximately 1,500 peacekeeping troops from five countries on the ground beside 
the 4,000 French peacekeepers, after the French troops stationed at Port Bouet 
were put under UN mandate. The troop presence helped guarantee some semblance 
of stability. The peace building conversation began to take shape as the country's 
major political parties and the New Forces signed a French brokered a series of 
Linas-Marcoussis Accords (LMA) in which they agreed to a power-sharing national 
reconciliation, and a government to include rebel New Forces representatives.12 
This meant that all the parties were going to now work together on rebuilding the 
nation by modifying national identity, eligibility for citizenship, and land tenure 
laws. These areas were sensitive issues.  They were the root cause of the eruption of 
conflict.  
 
These conversations were not without their challenges; the process of rebuilding 
peace and stability was not an easy process. There were more episodes of sporadic 
violence throughout 2004, which led to the Pretoria Agreement in 2005. This new 
agreement, which followed other short-lived accords signed in Lomé, formally 
ended the country's state of war, and seriously engaged on issues of disarmament, 




In 2007, at the initiative of President Gbagbo, negotiations led by Burkinabe 
President Compaoré in Ouagadougou, President Gbagbo and the New Forces leader 
Guillaume Soro finally agreed to a peace agreement aimed at reunifying the country 
and holding new elections in 2010. Incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and 
Alassane Ouattara were the main contestants, yet a number of different actors were 
involved in the lengthy process. From the government, the armed rebellion, the Côte 
d’Ivoire political parties, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), the International Organization of Francophonie 
to France and the United Nations (UN) were involved in the election. By the end of 
the second round Côte d’Ivoire had two winners, two governments and was once 
again on the verge of political collapse. Indeed, the Ivorian Independent Electoral 
Commission recognised Ouattara as the president with 54.1 per cent of the votes 
whilst the Ivorian Constitutional Council declared Gbagbo the winner. The UN and 
ECOWAS demanded for Gbagbo to step down with no avail.  As Laurent Gbagbo 
stubbornly refused to step down, he rallied his young militia against pro-Ouattara 
supporters.14 This triggered a response by the pro-Ouattara rebel groups in the 
North, which descended into Abidjan in a swift counter-attack. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that more than 100,000 people had 
then fled to neighbouring Liberia.15   
 
Fierce fighting erupted once again when results were announced, both in the 
political capital Yamoussoukro, its financial capital Abidjan, as well as across the 
Northern part of the country. The ICRC claimed that about 800 had been killed since 
the start of the conflict, whilst Caritas suggested more than 1,000 deaths. The Red 
Cross teams were collecting up to fifty bodies a day, many of those being children 
and pregnant women.16 With few humanitarian agencies on the ground and with 
very low mobility across the affected areas, numbers were probably higher than 
reported. The November 2010 elections were meant to bring a peaceful end to the 
long-standing political insecurity in the country. Yet, after several months of 
political violence, killings, looting and massive internal displacement of people, 




After more than three thousand people died since the start of the conflict in 
December 2010, on the 11th of April 2011, Laurent Gbagbo was arrested. Many 
celebrated the arrest of Gbagbo and saw this as an automatic return to peace. 
However, according to Radio France Internationale, security did not return to the 
city of Abidjan as there were still reports of armed incidents in some 
neighbourhoods. Six months after the elections, Alassane Ouattara was inaugurated 
as president; major political and economic reforms were to take place. He was 
expected to bring back security, as well as to revive the economy.  Politically, he 
assured many that his new government would include Gbagbo supporters in a bid to 
bring unity and reconciliation between the different groups. 17 
From a peace building perspective, one of the major challenges that faced the new 
presidency was to restore a united defence and security institutions. The new 
government had now to rebuild a nation destroyed by widespread ethnically and 
religiously based violence and prioritise reconciliation. Although Ouattara has had 
international recognition and is now officially the new president of Côte d’Ivoire, he 
faced a serious political and social crisis and fragile and divided security apparatus. 
In a country in dire need of a real change of political direction, whether he will be 
able to deliver is still very much an open-ended question more than half way into his 
presidency. To understand Cote d’Ivoire’s transformation from a stable economic 
and political powerhouse to a failing praetorian and chronically unstable state, it is 
important to first provide an historical background of its developmental trajectory 






The Political Economy of State building and Peace building in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
The main dynamics that have undergirded governance, politics, breakdown of 
stability, and the search for peace in Cote d’Ivoire relate to three factors: The fierce 
elite competition for power; the management of the economy and natural resources; 
and, most importantly how these two factors further amplified the citizenship and 
identity crisis and caused frustrations amongst Ivoirians. The centrality of these 
three factors to the analysis in this Baseline Study necessitates a brief discussion of 
how they have come to affect Cote d’Ivoire’s descent into war and instability. The 
role of former colonial power, France, also needs to be examined. In effect, France 
has played a significant and chequered role in the country’s trajectory throughout 
its history. 
I. Nation Building: Elite Competition for Political Power 
 
Many studies have linked the war and instability in Cote d’Ivoire to its complex 
political landscape, ethnic composition and an underlining a system of patron-client 
relations that have been in place since independence. The country like many post-
colonial African states had a number of various identities, both in terms of ethnicity 
and religion. With nearly eighty ethnic groups, the country has also faced, in recent 
years, a divide between the minority Christian population mainly in the South and 
the majority Muslim population mainly located in the North. These differences were 
exacerbated during recent state building and peace building efforts.  
Félix Houphouët Boigny, who ruled the country under an autocratic one party 
system, around whom much of the nation building and state building efforts were 
conducted, did not institutionalize democracy in Cote d’Ivoire.  His absolute control 
over the state building process was such that Cote d’Ivoire was dubbed a 
“Houphouet state.”18  His legitimacy came from his charismatic and traditional 
authority and the economic prosperity the country experienced under his 
leadership during the first two decades of independence. He also enjoyed France’s 
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strong support. Houphouët Boigny was from the ruling elite of the Baoulé ethnic 
group, which he increasingly put forward as being above the other ethnic groups.19 
Although in a muted way, political life became dominated, by ethnicity as 
Houphouët Boigny installed a system of ethnic quotas in government, where 
members of his group tended to get the lion share. At the time of his death, 
Houphouët Boigny had not prepared the country and its government for a 
successor.20 The constitution was amended a number of times without settling the 
issue of succession.  The politicization and manipulation of ethnicity for political 
ends was most notable during multi-party elections in the early 1990s when the La 
Baule doctrine forced multiparty elections on Francophone countries.  Gbagbo and 
then Bédié used strategies comparable to Houphouët Boigny’s to gain support from 
their own ethnic groups. These strategies were to become damaging for the country 
and ultimately laid the foundation for the destruction that was to come.21 
 
When the Ivoirité was introduced into the political discourse, it morphed from an 
attempt to define Ivorian identity into a ‘nationalist-qua-ethnic political stratagem 
disguised as patriotism’22. This concept was to be the demise of the nation both 
within its political leadership but also across the masses. The concept was being 
used by the intellectual and political elite, led by Bédié at the time, in hope of 
holding on to power. When General Guei overthrew Bédié, the concept simply 
continued to exist as the general also used it to favour his own ethnic group, the 
Yacouba, but also to keep Mr. Ouattara barred from running for the 2000 
presidential election. The Ivorian political landscape and conversations related to 
state building became significantly dominated by ivoirité and ethno-politics, which 
also became the norm and the only strategy for garnering political support. As a 
staunch nationalist and originally against the dubious concept, once in power, 
Gbagbo did not go against this norm and instead played the ethnic card to the hilt.  
He increased the representation of his own ethnic group, the Bété, and other ethnic 




Cote d’Ivoire’s political trajectory was a complex one in which identity politics, a 
lack of resources with a failing economy led to its political elite survival mechanism 
to rely heavily on ethnicity as a means of ensuring popular support. This 
degenerated quickly and dangerously into intractable citizenship and related issues 
of who belongs or does not, affecting also the large numbers of foreigners living in 
the country.  Soon it would lead to a violent and costly conflict.    
 
II. Economic sustainability and access to national resources  
 
Endowed with abundant natural resources, and having embraced an unabashed 
capitalist path to economic development, by the 1980s, as Azikiwe notes, Cote 
d’Ivoire had an economy that accounted for over 40% of the economy of 
Francophone West Africa, thanks in part to the cocoa boom.24 Richard Crook, who 
has written extensively on West Africa, details a government policy that created ‘a 
‘free-for-all’ on land acquisition and labour migration [in which the cocoa boom’s] 
political costs ethnically mobilised political conflict and freedom for the state to 
regulate land access through arbitrary, centralised patronage’.25 A success story that 
would be short-lived as the cocoa prices fell with the worldwide economic recession 
at the beginning of the 1980s.  There is also no doubt that the French government’s 
unilateral decision to devaluate the CFA franc (which was then pegged on the 
French Franc) by 50 percent in 1994, severely affected the economic wellbeing of 
Ivoirians. This happened as structural adjustment programs were being 
implemented as a condition for additional loans to an already heavily indebted Cote 
d’Ivoire, struggling to keep up.  The country suffered two major economic crises 
prior to its civil war, which unleashed major social unrest.26 The decline of cocoa 
prices in the 1980s was the reflection of years of parastatal laissez-faire policies and 
wasteful prestige spending that were the signature of Houphouët Boigny’s control 
over Cote d’Ivoire’s finances and economic policies.  
 
The economic downturns due to poor economic policies and other structural causes 
were not the sole cause of the ensuing instability. However, the economic scarcity 
13 
 
they induced and the inability of the Ivoirian state to continue its patronage and 
clientelistic policies were doubtlessly a significant cause for the tensions that led the 
elites to manipulate ethnicity as a means of appealing for the masses support for 
access to political power when the single party era was replaced by multiparty 
politics in the 1990s. The economic recession also meant that land as the main 
economic resource, became inextricably tangled with notions of identity and power. 
The scramble for power and legitimacy among the elites turned them blind towards 
the violence that was slowly creeping into Ivorian life.  
 
III. Identity and Power 
 
While in power, Houphouët Boigny encouraged foreigners from mainly Mali and 
Burkina Faso (with majority Muslim populations), to seek employment in the 
Ivorian cocoa plantations. The result was a country in which population migration 
and in-country migrants represented upwards of 25% of its population, residing 
mainly in the cocoa regions of the country. Knowing the importance of identity in 
Ivorian politics, the extensive migration from neighbouring Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
other West African countries is directly associated with the cocoa-growing agro- 
industry.  The ensuing ethnic tensions became palpable during the crisis in the 
1980s, and thereafter, in the ethnic violence of the 1990s and 2000s.27 
 
The impact of massive in-migration and emigration waves policies was strongly felt 
in the social and political foundations of the country as ethno-religious narratives 
were manipulated by successive heads of state to pit communities against one 
another,28  when competition for resources, land in particular became intense. One 
example of this was seen in Houphouët Boigny’s policy of ‘the land belongs to those 
who develop it’, which encouraged members of his ethnic group, Baoulé, to migrate 
to forested areas and plant cocoa.29 
 
Many saw the generous immigration policy as an outcome and illustration of the 
‘Ivorian Miracle.’ However, it has a direct link to the rise in xenophobic sentiments 
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across Ivoirian society, as economic difficulties made immigrants an easy target for 
scapegoating. Houphouët Boigny’s government actively and openly promoted 
immigration and migration to suit its own political and economic interests. Bédié 
followed suit and openly adopted Ivoirité as a political tool to fight his opposition. 
Gueï’s leadership was short-lived, and despite promising to be different, ended up in 
similar fashion. Ggagbo’s regime, sometimes referred to as the régime de la 
refondation, in reference to it claim to be committed to overhauling the neocolonial 
state, in fact exacerbated the issue and failed dismally in its attempt to redefine the 
nation when it wrestled power from general Guei. 
The case of Cote d’Ivoire illustrates how the causes of violent conflict are not always 
straightforward and cannot be attributed to one single factor. War and instability in 
this case were a result of the complex interaction between historical, social, 
economic and political factors characteristic of the Cote d’Ivoire’s particular context. 
The next section looks in some detail into the different responses to the peace 
process once tensions degenerated into violence and outright civil war, the different 
actors involved and how the process affected national conversations on the way 
forward for the nation. 
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Responding To Armed Conflict 
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the issues at the root of the conflict are 
multifaceted and complex. The various aspects of the state building conversation — 
ethno-nationalism, the distribution of economic resources and access to power — 
would all need to be addressed in the peace building process if Côte d’Ivoire was to 
move from a situation of ‘no peace, no war’ to one on the path towards a 
consolidated, unified and peaceful nation. The following section will analyse this and 
attempt to assess the degree to which the peace process has contributed to 
furthering the state building conversation. It will do this by first identifying the 
leading actors, highlighting the role of international actors and their negative impact 
on issues of local ownership. This will be followed by an overview of the settlement 
process and the degree to which it addressed the identity issue as a key to state 
building. Thus, this analysis will set the stage for the next section, which will assess 
the outcomes of the peace building process.  
 
Following the failed coup of 2002 and the outbreak of civil war, a ceasefire 
agreement separated the government controlled south from the rebel-held North. 
Dividing the country in two, the zone of confidence provided a concrete symbol for 
the discrepancy between northern and southern narratives of Ivoirian society. 
Following this, several attempts were made at negotiating a settlement. However, 
this would be a start-and-stop process where each subsequent settlement would 
face implementation challenges. The reasons for this include stalling tactics by 
elites, unfavourable circumstances and inherent problems in the agreement that 
made it difficult to sell to the population. The final settlement, the Ouagadougou 
Political Agreement, a largely home-grown process, seemed most promising. 
However, the country suffered through a second crisis in 2010, putting in question 
the largely positive response received by the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement. The 
second crisis was ended through military victory, making Côte d’Ivoire an 
interesting case study for the overall research project in which this study falls. 
Overall, the settlement process was a series of complex negotiations and events that 
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ranged from the standard blueprint for internationally (in most cases, regionally) 
driven peace processes, and more tailored talks that illustrated the ongoing, but still 
chequered, state building conversation in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
i. Leading Actors 
 
The Ivoirian peace process played host to actors of multiple levels — national, 
regional and international. The role of international actors is important to note, 
particularly in juxtaposition to national actors and the different affects these actors 
would have on the peace process. France, notorious for maintaining close ties with 
its former colonies, played a significant role, first in the conflict through military 
intervention to stabilise the situation, and then in the settlement process as a 
facilitator. Yet, there was significant involvement of the international community in 
general throughout the peace process. ECOWAS supported the peace process 
through various means, most notably by providing a cease-fire monitoring mission 
— ECOWAS Forces in Côte d’Ivoire (EOCMICI). 19  These forces were later 
incorporated into the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), when it 
was established in 2004.20 The UN, then, supported the peace process by conducting 
peacekeeping, monitoring the implementation process and putting pressure on non-
compliant Ivoirian leaders. Individual states at a regional and sub-regional level, 
also had an interest in, and supported the various stages of, the settlement process. 
Burkina Faso and South Africa, as mediators, are most notable.  
 
Finally, at a national level, the two key protagonists were the Ivoirian government, 
led by Laurent Gbagbo, and the rebel forces, led by Guillaume Soro, in support of 
Allasane Ouattara. The Forces Nouvelles (FN) was an alliance of three smaller rebel 
groups — the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), the Ivoirian Popular 
Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace 
(MJP) — who hailed predominantly from the north and were against the doctrine of 
Ivoirité. The multiple and complex actions of these various actors would result in the 
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signing of over ten peace agreements and 12 UN resolutions.21 In the end, it would 
be the home-grown accords signed in Ouagadougou that would stick—until it 
unravelled with the 2010 presidential election.  
ii. The Settlement Process 
As a result of the heavy involvement of foreign actors, the internationally sponsored 
peace agreements and subsequent peace efforts largely followed the liberal peace 
model.22 This would generally include a ceasefire, a power-sharing agreement, a 
disarmament plan, and elections.23 The last of these would receive significant 
attention but also remain one of the most challenging sticking points for the 
protagonists. Often times, unrealistic pressure would be placed on the state’s 
administrative capacities and on elites to hold elections as soon as possible. This 
would often result in the building of tensions, increased inflammatory rhetoric in a 
bid to hold a support base, and, ultimately, the stalling of elections for several years. 
Throughout, the statebuilding conversation continued in other forums. The 
citizenship issue remained fractious, land and identity remained a source of inter-
communal violence in the western regions and youth militia groups mobilised 
around religious, regional, ethnic and national differences in the urban areas. 
 
The first successful negotiations took place in 2003 under the guidance of France, 
with the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. There had been attempts to 
negotiate before this, under the auspices of ECOWAS, in Lomé. But these talks 
quickly broke down.24 A key feature of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was the 
negotiation amongst elites regarding the distribution of power. This led to a power-
sharing agreement that would take form in a Government of National Reconciliation 
and in which FN would be given the key Defence and Interior portfolios.25 The 
citizenship issue was addressed in an appendix, which detailed the identification 
process.26 This appendix reaffirmed existing laws regarding citizenship, without 
adequately discussing the discord regarding who should be part of the political and 
national community. The laws had been interpreted in various and dangerous ways 
previously, and the agreement allowed these diverse interpretations based on jus 
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sanguinis or jus soli to remain.27 In addition, this elite bargaining over power was 
not easy to sell at home, resulting in protests on the part of the Young Patriots, a 
militant group of young Ivorians who supported Gbagbo and his nationalist 
agenda.28 At the same time, France’s refusal to come to Gbagbo’s aid at the start of 
the conflict and its recognition of the rebellion through the peace talks resulted in a 
loss of face on Gbagbo’s part. This quickly led to Gbagbo backtracking and stalling 
the implementation process.29 
 
As a result, violence continued, particularly in the western regions, where land 
tenure issues are especially acute.30 ECOWAS, in 2003, initiated further talks which 
led to the Accra II and Accra III accords.31 These, however, did little to stabilise the 
country. Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR), for example, was 
repeatedly stalled due to a lack of trust and movement on other aspects of the 
accords.32 In light of the situation, then South African President Thabo Mbeki, 
stepped in as mediator with the support of the African Union.33 This led to a new set 
of accords, signed in Pretoria on 6 April 2005. One key feature of the Pretoria 
accords, that would have important consequences later on, was that the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) was given the responsibility to 
certify the electoral process.34 By this time, France had stepped backed from the 
negotiating process as the patriotic narrative supporting the violence was only 
fuelled by the former colonial power’s interest in the conflict.35 These agreements, 
however, did not address the citizenship question, and focused on technical matters 
of disarmament and elections.36 They then can be seen as increasingly failing 
attempts on the part of the international community to stabilise a deteriorating 
situation and more successful attempts by protagonists to stall a concrete resolution 
to the conflict. 
The events leading to the Ouagadougou agreement are complex. A combination of 
war-weariness, international pressure and political calculations drove the parties of 
the conflict to seek another solution. The International Working Group, which was 
meant to oversee the implementation of the peace process had proven largely 
ineffective and was regularly circumvented by the conflict protagonists.37 Similarly, 
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steps to implement the peace process were often undermined by inflammatory 
discourse. For example, when a pilot scheme was launched to begin the 
identification process, Gbagbo fostered distrust by stating fraud would take place in 
the rebel-controlled regions and the pro-Gbagbo press launched attacks on 
Ouattara.38 In 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1721, which 
limited Gbagbo’s renewed mandate (as an unelected president) for only a year, and 
increased the powers of Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, who was meant to 
implement the peace agreement.39 In response, Gbagbo announced his plan for 
‘direct dialogue’, stressing the need for Ivoirians to take ownership of the peace 
process.40 The talks were initiated by Gbagbo himself, because he likely realised that 
the stalemate situation no longer favoured him, and included Gbagbo and Soro, with 
Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré as facilitator.41 President Gbagbo seemed 
to have recaptured the national motto of “dialogue” (in this case intra-Ivoirian 
dialogue) once championed by and identified with the late Houphouet-Boigny, now 
revered (and whose wisdom was singularly missed) father of a drifting nation.  The 
language of the new negotiations, highlighting dialogue, seem more in line with that 
of a nationally owned statebuilding conversation. The announcement also followed 
years of conflict where patriotic and inflammatory language was used to undermine 
internationally driven peace talks.  President Gbagbo cleverly couched the need for 
such an intra-Ivoirian dialogue in anti-French nationalist rhetoric that found readily 
resonance among a mass of disillusioned and unemployed youth eager to find a 
scapegoat for their frustrations.  This shrewdness, ability to manipulate rivals and 
partners alike, and determination to go to any length to remain in power served 
Gbagbo well for a decade.  Sadly, these same character traits were to bring him 
down in the end.   
 
The new agreement addressed various issues. With regards to political power, FN 
leader Soro was given the post of Prime Minister.42 Plans were also made for rebel 
forces to be integrated into the national army and for the northern part of the 
country to return under state control.43 In addition, it was ambitiously proposed 
that elections be held within 10 months of the signing of the agreement.44 
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Afterwards, the post of Prime Minister was given to Soro, and Gbagbo’s powers as 
president were reinstated.45 This then, provided a promising foundation on which to 
move forward with reconsolidating the state’s political and security functions.  
 
iii. Identity and Statebuilding in the Settlement Process 
 
The implementation of this agreement was slow, but nevertheless succeeded where 
other agreements had failed. Some have pointed out that this is because it was a 
locally driven process that more directly addressed the identity issue.46 Many 
actually viewed the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement as an overall success.47 
However, it still had several weaknesses. The peace process was primarily an elite 
activity, concentrating largely on issues of power.48 However, the root causes of the 
conflict particularly that which drove the population, surrounded issues of identity 
and the distribution of resources, land in particular. While the agreement addressed 
this issue, the peacebuilding that followed did not follow-through on the citizenship 
question. It should have extended this dialogue to the population. This would then 
allow the country’s citizens to decide on what terms they would relate to each other. 
However, the exclusion of civil society in the negotiation and subsequent phases 
made this challenging.49 In reality, the reconciliatory talks that took place at the 
political level between leaders did not carry the same tone of dialogue and 
compromise when brought to the population. Rather, the press remained virulent 
and leaders easily resorted to inflammatory speeches when tensions ran high.  
 
The agreement also made limited provisions to promote reconciliation and active 
dialogue about the conflict. The ‘measures for reconciliation’ focused primarily on 
practical issues such as provisions for amnesty, the reduction of arms and the free 
movement of people.50 There was no provision for a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission or similar mechanism that would promote dialogue. Nor was there 
mention of the highly contentious issue of land tenure. The civil war had aggravated 
existing land disputes by displacing people from their land.51 These issues are 
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central to the statebuilding conversation as they feed into the economic structures, 
access to wealth, which, beyond identity markers, are central to the citizenship 
debate. Indeed, structural inequalities, especially when combined with ethnic 
identity, need to be addressed as part of the root cause of the conflict.52 While it is 
perhaps not necessary (or possible) that all this be mentioned directly in the 
agreement itself, the fact that it was omitted meant allowing these issues to fester 
unaddressed. Rather, focus turned to preparing for elections, which were repeatedly 
stalled until the likely contestants, singularly president Gbagbo, felt they had a 
reasonable chance of winning (or retaining) power. The identification process, then, 
centred around how citizenship would affect electoral results, rather than on the 
determination of, and strengthening of the composition of the Ivoirian society and 
state. 
 
Another identity marker that has not received enough attention in the Ivoirian case 
is that of gender. The Ivoirian constitution does, in principle, grant gender rights.53 
Similarly, Côte d’Ivoire has generally been perceived as progressive in these issues. 
For example, it was once referred to as a regional safe haven for homosexuals.54 This 
does not mean, however, that discrimination on issues of gender did not occur. 
Women, for example, were still largely given subordinate positions in the 
household, the workplace and in politics.55 Furthermore, many women were 
negatively affected by the crisis, both the war and the period leading up to it . The 
discourse of Ivoirité resulted in some women losing citizenship rights when their 
husbands’ citizenship status was called into question. In addition, sexual violence 
was used as a strategy to denigrate ‘foreigners’.56 On the other hand, women were 
also active in pushing the Ivoirité agenda, exemplified in the inciting, religious 
rhetoric of First Lady Simone Gbagbo.57 Finally, women’s rights groups were active 
in campaigning for peace.58 Despite this, women were not included in the peace 
negotiations.59 Thus, while the UN regularly highlighted women’s rights in its 
resolutions, the various peace agreements were glaringly silent on gender issues.  
And there was no significant gender representation on either side of the 




In general then, this final agreement more naturally addressed the state building 
conversation, in addition to peace building, due to its homegrown nature. However, 
it did not fundamentally change the orientation, the main actors, and critically, the 
finality (beyond avoiding a return to fighting) of the dual processes. The identity 
issue, as a root cause of the conflict, was given centre stage.60 It did not resolve the 
matter completely by defining Ivoirian citizenship but did provide a way to move 
forward with the citizenship conversation.61 The agreement was able to improve the 
immediate security situation and eventually lead to elections. 62  Yet, the 
identification process failed to gain significant traction, as a lack of trust and good 
will persisted amongst leaders and the population.63 Thus, in light of the recent 
crisis, it is perhaps prudent to see the agreement and the talks that led to them as 
only a part of the conversation. Failure to continue the dialogue beyond preparing 
for elections resulted in a renewed crisis, a military victory, and the current, 
relatively stable but hardly peaceful, environment. 
 
What Outcomes Emerged? 
 
Thus, it is clear that the settlement process had both positive and negative 
components when viewed in terms of state building. We will now seek to assess the 
outcomes of this process on these issues. While many had high hopes for the peace 
process when elections finally came around in late 2010, the events that followed 
would dash many hopes that Côte d’Ivoire was on the path to recovery. After the 
second round of elections, Ouattara was declared the winner by the electoral 
commission and the international community, with more than 54 percent of the 
vote.64 However, the Constitutional Council, which was loyal to Gbagbo, chose to 
overturn the results, in clear overstepping of its authority under the electoral law, 
declaring Gbagbo the winner. With two candidates, on opposite sides of the Ivoirité 
debate, both claiming to be the elected and legitimate president of the country, Côte 
d’Ivoire was thrown back into violent conflict. According to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the post-election crisis that followed resulted in approximately 
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3000 deaths, on both sides of the conflict.65 The impasse came to an end when rebel 
forces captured Gbagbo with the assistance of the French military. However, the 
ease with which people mobilised around the ethno-nationalist discourses used 
during the crisis and with which armed groups were able to mobilise indicates that 
divisions at the heart of the conflict remained salient. It is yet too early to tell 
whether the military victory by Ouattara’s supporters will result in a more coherent 
statebuilding direction. While for the moment, the country holds on to a fragile 
peace as the population seeks to move forward, there are some worrying trends that 
are indicated below. 
i. Transformation of Identity Markers and Root Causes 
A key indicator of whether identity markers shifted after the peace process is the 
electoral map of the 2010 elections. Just prior to the conflict, party support was 
achieved primarily through appealing to ethnic affinities. In general, this trend 
seems to persist. Gbagbo’s support base remained concentrated in the western 
regions,66 (And Abidjan) indicating the persistence and continued relevance of his 
ethno-nationalist strategy and the identity markers that predated the war. The votes 
won by Ouattara and Bédié also indicate a close correlation between voters’ 
ethnicity and the ethnicity of the candidate.67 In addition, when the situation took a 
turn for the worse after the election results were disputed, the western regions — 
where the land rights debate is most prominent — witnessed renewed inter-
communal conflict between autochthons and those perceived to be ‘foreign’ or with 
northern origins.68 Thus, during the elections, which are often used as a signal of 
peace in the liberal peace model, the discourses of militant patriotism, autochthony 
and ethno-nationalism were still strong. Yet, an analysis of the electoral map shows 
some positive developments with regards to identity. In the second round of the 
elections, a coalition of formerly divided ethnic and regional parties formed under 
the leadership of Ouattara and Bédié, so that Ouattara received a large portion of 
Bédié’s votes in the second round.69 This indicates that, while those identity 
markers that proved so divisive before the war still remained, there was the 




In the end, ethnicity still influenced voting behaviour and the perceived interests of 
constituents. These interests persist today. In the western regions, where autocthon 
discourses and land tenure disputes combine with poverty to cause inter-communal 
tensions, violence has been particularly acute. The two regions of Cavally and 
Guémon, were particularly hard-hit by the electoral crisis, and violence continued 
more than two years later.70 Rather than promoting reconciliation or the resolution 
of land conflicts in these regions, the government has relied primarily on a security 
crackdown while pursuing economic development at a national level.  While it is 
important that security be restored and the state regain the monopoly of the use of 
force, this has not been done in tandem with a discussion on how to also restore the 
legitimacy of that state. The pursuit of national economic development may yet bear 
some fruit in this regard, if done in an equitable manner that addresses the key 
economic grievances of various groups. 
Another identity marker is that of religion, which, as it overlaps with identity, 
remains divisive. Highly volatile religious symbolism was used in the run-up to the 
elections to mobilise first voters and then, when the elections turned sour, militants. 
Gbagbo’s wife was particularly notorious for such statements.71 There were also 
incidents of violence targeting opposing religious groups.72 The conflation of 
religion and state is a conversation that has yet to be had. Article 30 of the Ivoirian 
constitution describes the state as ‘indivisible, secular, democratic and social’.73 Yet, 
the fact that religion remains a potent political tool indicates that Ivoirians, certainly 
their political elites, may not have entirely accepted this foundational prescription 
of the Ivoirian state.  
 
With regards to gender, it appears as though there have been attempts to alter the 
dominant patriarchal structures. For example, Ouattarra’s government tabled a new 
marriage law that would allow wives to be joint heads of the household, though it 
was met by opposition from other members in the coalition government (PDCI), 
resulting in a dissolution of the government.74 Unfortunately, widespread sexual 
violence also persists and remains largely under-prosecuted. Police generally refuse 
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to investigate unless a medical certificate, which requires payment, is provided; 
even though this is not a legal requirement.75  
 
Thus, it seems that a gap remains between legal provisions for gender equality and 
perceptions amongst the population. In other words, the narrative embodied in the 
institutions and laws that exist, is not necessarily the narrative accepted by the 
population. A country’s constitution is meant to be the foundational document that 
governs the social contract between people and state within a country. The Ivoirian 
constitution, which indicates that unity in diversity is the path to economic 
progress,76 has not characterised the social and political relations in the country in 
the last two decades. It remains to be seen whether the new government will 
succeed in moving political dialogue from identity-based fixations to interest-based 
issues. 
ii. Legitimacy and Societal Trust 
The resort to violent action in 2002 was the ultimate indication that many in Côte 
d’Ivoire had lost faith in the legitimacy of the state and its institutions and decided 
to metaphorically raise the tone in the state building conversations that were 
supposed have been going on since independence.  Various issues fuelled this lack of 
trust but in this section we must try to determine whether some of that societal 
trust has been restored. In other words, did the peace process restore the legitimacy 
of state institutions and the political process sufficiently to indicate that the state 
building conversation has qualitatively progressed.  
 
Throughout the various negotiations of the peace process, several weaknesses 
remained. Perhaps the most glaring was the lack of any representation of civil 
society. By civil society, we refer to Ivoirian organisations and citizens that are not 
members of state institutions or sponsored by the government. In other words, 
there was no meaningful and purposeful representation of the various interest 
groups in the society, including women, labour groups, religious groups, 
representative of traditional institutions, and the like. As a result, the issues 
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discussed at negotiations centred on the interests and agendas of the elites at the 
table, those interests and agendas being primarily about the distribution of power 
and its spoils. The causes of the conflict, namely land tenure and citizenship, and 
equitable stake in economic development, were issues that were politicised and 
dramatised by leaders as a means to gain power or retain it. The core issues of 
interest to civil society and to the ordinary citizen did not affect directly the 
interests of those around the table as they did those of ordinary people. Thus, the 
elite-centred negotiations addressed the grievances and interests of the leaders 
(access to political power) but not, in a substantive manner, those of the people 
(access to economic resources and citizenship). Similarly, the sponsors to the 
various peace agreements also carried their own interests to the table. France, in 
particular, had invested economic and strategic interests in Côte d’Ivoire, which 
were likely threatened by Gbagbo’s economic and political views. This affected 
France’s attitude and explains its policies towards the Forces nouvelles and its 
refusal to come to Gbagbo’s aid at the onset and throughout the crisis. These 
interests, as well as those of regional powers, were not congruent with the root 
causes of the conflict, detracting from the ability to discuss the same issues 
substantively, and associate all segments of Ivoirian society. 
 
The various Linas-Marcoussis Agreements, the Lomé Accords, the Pretoria Accords 
and the Ougadougou Political Accords all highlighted elections (and intermediary 
power sharing arrangements) as the path to peace. Elections, as such, were almost 
fetishized as the solution to the crisis without ever going to the heart of what caused 
the conflict in the first place. Even the Ougadougou Political Accord, which gave 
more space to the citizenship issue, framed the identity debate within the electoral 
issue by providing for identification through the electoral roll. The issues of land and 
economic development, which were central to the dramatisation of the citizenship 
debate, were not addressed sufficiently by any of the agreements. No plan was laid 
out on how to restore the remarkable economic growth that alleviated so much the 
contradictions within Ivoirian society. This was important since it was an economic 
crisis that sparked conflict in the first place. Similarly, while there are mechanisms 
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to handle land disputes, these are often in contradiction with each other as they 
originate both from traditional land tenure systems and modern legal systems. No 
decision was made on which would take precedence, allowing the ambiguity around 
land tenure to remain as a potential source of future conflicts. Thus, the 
conversations that were going on during the peace building process were truncated 
primarily because, in essence, they excluded the key actors and core issues to the 
conflict and in so doing ended up stifling progress on comprehensive solution to the 
state building crisis. 
 The high electoral turnout, which was over 80 percent of the electorate,77 was a 
sign that the peace process had restored at least some level of trust in the political 
system.  It certainly indicated the eagerness of the population to do its part in trying 
to resolve the underlying dispute through the ultimate political means. The elections 
were supposed to end it by involving those in whose name the long running dispute 
is supposed to be fought so bitterly.  
However, the elections also showed significant weakness in institutional legitimacy 
when, in a brazen political move, the electoral results from seven northern electoral 
circumscriptions were thrown out by the Constitutional Council, making Gbagbo the 
winner. The blame for the electoral crisis is generally placed on Gbagbo’s refusal to 
give up power, even after the elections, as called by the Independent Electoral 
Commission (CEI), were certified by the United Nations SRSG. The subsequent crisis 
would highlight the gap between negative and positive peace. Elections were able to 
take place due to the relative stability that the peace process fostered. However, 
Gbagbo’s ability to garner mass support after losing at the polls and the quick resort 
to violence showed that there was little buy-in to the electoral process. Even prior to 
the elections, there were signs of this lack of faith. In the west, rumours circulated 
that if one candidate lost the supporters of the other would be attacked.  Such fears 
indicate a lack of trust both between opposing groups and in the state’s ability and 
willingness to protect its citizens. In other words, the peace that had been achieved 
prior to the elections only set the stage for what should have been a deeper and 
longer state building process that would restore the social contract between citizens 
and the institutions that are meant to represent and protect them.  
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Lessons learning  
 
Cote d’Ivoire’s peace building process has had the singularity of having force of arms 
–not the implementation of a formal peace agreement-- resolve the long standing 
political dispute and the post electoral crisis stand-off that wrecked the final peace 
agreement the various Ouagadougou accords were supposed to be.  The 
conversations for peace building and the larger state building that were jump-
started were largely shaped by this singular fact.  One side won, and the other 
collapsed to the point of not being there to even sign a formal surrender.  Indeed, 
the defeat was not formalised in any sense, though major actors in the defeated 
camp more or less sincerely pledged allegiance to president Ouattara shortly after 
former president Gbagbo’s arrest on April 11, 2011. Consequently, the 
conversations about immediate peace building and the larger state building 
continued in this context. 
 
As for any other West African state that experienced constant instability for more 
than two decades and the trauma of a full-blown civil war, for Cote d’Ivoire, peace 
will have to mean more than just leaving behind the overt manifestations of 
murderous physical violence and attendant socioeconomic hardships that so 
victimised the Ivorian people.  Although armed violence by more or less organised 
groups has markedly diminished since 2011, there are still instances of sporadic 
violence that are antithetical to peace in its simplest sense.  Furthermore, peace 
building must also mean more than drastically reducing the symbolic violence that 
has become rife in the current political culture. This is evident in the vitriolic 
pronouncements of Ivoirian political parties and media editorials, singularly 
newspapers.78  For Cote d’Ivoire, sustainable peace must mean resolutely engaging 
an irreversible process of banning as unacceptable, even inconceivable, the option of 
threatening, in any form, much less using violence as a part of its state building 
conversations. This objective cannot be conceived as an end product. It is a 
permanent process that conditions, sustains, indeed, melds within the broader 
process of state/nation building.  Again, as for any other postcolonial African state, 
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the latter process is best characterised as the long-term purposeful venture of 
“creating the various institutions of a machinery of governance including the 
administrative, political and constitutional subsystems of the society with which the 
leaders exercise sovereign authority.”79  Obviously, the record of the venture that 
started more than fifty years ago, the “machinery of governance” that was being put 
in place before the crisis of the late 1990s and so far in the post-electoral crisis era, 
suggests that the state building project is in need of adjustments to say the least.   In 
other words, the conversations that contribute to shaping the current state of affairs 
need correction both in tone and in content.  Since the end of the post electoral 
crisis, these conversations have somehow lost the virulent tone and violence that 
characterised them during the November 2010-April 2011 period.   
 
As to the substance and the accompanying policies to carry on the peace building 
and state building endeavour, a review of a few of them can serve to illustrate. It 
should be noted that, to his credit, President Ouattara wasted no time tackling the 
daunting task of trying to pull Cote d’Ivoire out of the predicament it found itself in 
on April 12, 2011 when president Gbagbo was dragged out of the ruins of his 
bombed out presidential palace.  Enjoying the legitimacy bestowed on him by the 
international community, and the reputation of an able economist with a long 
experience in IFIs and in bailing out developing countries in dire economic 
situations, he succeeded in mobilising billions to jump-start the economy with an 
emphasis on labour intensive infrastructure building projects, and tackle the 
pressing issues of security and reconciliation in a particularly trying environment. 
His focus on economic growth is starting to bear fruit as indicators show that Côte 
d’Ivoire is on the path to economic recovery, with a GDP increase of 9.8 per cent in 
one year.80   A promotion of economic development is of course an important 
dimension in the state building process. 
  
A Truth, Dialogue, and Reconciliation Commission was set up. Made up of eminent 
and respected personalities, it is headed by Charles Konan Banny, a former Prime 
Minister. It should be noted that one of its members is Didier Drogba, a famed 
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professional footballer in Europe, around whose name all Ivoirian have no problem 
rallying.  This is recognition of the importance and potential of football in the peace 
building process.  Indeed, events around this very popular sport has been used for 
reconciling and uniting Ivoirians, who fervently rally behind the national team, 
forgetting their many lines of division.81 The commission has been working since, 
reorienting somehow the national conversations on peace and state building. It 
revived and reinvigorated the exhausted concepts of “national reconciliation” and 
“dialogue” through a communication campaign and other activities throughout the 
country and in the Ivoirian communities in the Diaspora, though the hurdles 
remains staggering and the results still very limited.  The tension between 
reconciliation (which 83 % of Ivoirians believe is possible and desirable), the need 
to move on, and the cries for justice from the families of the 3000 killed and other 
victims (numbering tens of thousands) of the post-electoral crisis have made for 
difficult conversations and made more complicated the mission of the 
Commission.82  However, there is no alternative to this approach despite the 
attempts from various corners to manipulate the commission and its activities in 
pursuit of political ends.  In spite of its limitations, its symbolism and psychological 
effect are critical to the dialogue and post-conflict rebuilding of a sense of national 
community and healing.   
 
The decisive irruption of the military and other security forces on the national 
political scene in December 1999 (after a creeping role that started arguably much 
earlier), of course, the extensive use of weapons during the conflict and the 
permanent role security issues have played in national conversations combined to 
make the need to attend to the security sector and its relations to democratic 
institutions and to the citizenry imperative in the post crisis environment.   
  
As N’Diaye has argued, the crisis only exacerbated a long-standing deleterious 
situation for the security sector and the state more generally, with deeper and older 
roots that were never attended to when propitious opportunities arose.83  The 
situation created by the rebellion and the subsequent division of the country also 
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added another layer, creating a veritable political economy of permanent insecurity 
in which only managed to thrive a small group of civilian and military elites to the 
detriment of the populations and state institutions, which nearly collapsed. The post 
elections crisis and its security dimensions in particular needed to be seized upon to 
identify avenues for Cote d’Ivoire and its partners to develop strategies and action 
plans to implement genuine security sector reforms (SSR) to tackle this legacy.  
After the crisis, such reforms were seen as the cornerstone of national reconciliation 
not the least of which is the reconciliation between Ivoirian civil institutions and 
citizens and their armed and security forces, given the widespread human rights 
abuse that occurred.  These reforms are also the condition for long-term political 
stability (for Cote d’Ivoire and its neighbourhood), and a democratic state based on 
the rule of law.  This seems to have been the analysis President Ouattara shared 
when he appointed a national commission with a mandate to submit within 3 
months a detailed plan to carry out a genuine and holistic security sector reform.  
That commission’s work, supported technically by the UN mission in Cote d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI) and France, fulfilled its mission and proposed a comprehensive plan to 
reform nearly all sectors of the Ivorian state, its society and economy that is affected 
by security broadly constructed. The commission proposed also a comprehensive 
demobilisation disarmament, and reinsertion plan, that will contribute to peace 
building as well as reduced one of the most direct causes of conflict youth 
unemployment and availability of weapons.  The national strategy on security sector 
reform developed in Cote d’Ivoire is one of the most comprehensive and inclusive so 
far in West Africa.  Notably, it features a gender dimension that was made salient by 
the disproportionate victimisation of women throughout the crisis, and the fact that 
in some security bodies such as the gendarmerie, there still are no women.  The 
need to reform the security sector, professionalise members of the security forces 
and isolate them from politics and ethnic manipulation has become an integral part 
of the national conversations.  This has served to highlight the urgent need to 
demilitarise and reduce a pervasive culture of violence from Ivoirian society and 




 Part of the national conversation has been the issue of impunity and justice for the 
victims of the various human right abuses since the start of the armed conflict in 
2002.  The sending of former president Gbagbo and his former minister of youth and 
fervent supporter, Blé Goudé, to the International Criminal Court in The Hague and 
the continued absence of serious persecution of any of the Ouattara side of the 
conflict (evidenced by more than 150 thus far of Gbagbo’s supporters arrested or on 
trial and none from Ouattara’s) have infused into the national conversations the 
notion of “victors’ justice.”84   This new concept has dominated the conversations on 
the need for justice for victims and complicated the efforts to move forward in the 
peace building process. Beyond its immediate implications for the peace building 
because of the deep resentment it inspires president Gabgbo’s supporters,85 the 
issue of the ICC has became an important theme of the state building process since it 
goes to national sovereignty and to whether the Ivoirian state has built (or rebuilt) a 
judicial system up to the task of judging accused criminals independently of the 
political authority and the pressures of public opinion.   
 
As indicated throughout this study, the Ivoirian political class has been prisoner of 
ethnic politics since at least the formal introduction of the concept of Ivoirité under 
the Bédié régime.  This poisonous concept and the related loaded notions of 
“northerners” and “southerners” have not been extirpated from the political 
discourse and mindset of most political actors and ordinary Ivoirians.  While the 
national assembly passed a law on nationality and land, the tensions that marked 
the debate even between the politically allied parties in power, President Ouattara’s 
RDR and Bédié’s PDCI, not to mention the vociferous opposition of Gbagbo’s party, 
the FPI,86 were a clear indication that much still needs to be done to ban forever 
these concepts not just from the formal conversations.  With the 2015 presidential 
elections looming, disputes on the census, ongoing, ethnically or regionally based 
tensions still brewing under the surface, and political parties such as the FPI, not yet 
reconciled to having lost power, this unresolved politics of ethnicity is bound to 
remain a dangerous unknown.  Even when one bears in mind Marina Ottaway’s 
astute observation that “in much of Africa ethnicity is not a problem until it is made 
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a problem,”87 as Brian Kaas has convincingly demonstrated, appealing to ethnicity 
has remained the surest mechanism for political leaders to mobilise followers and 
retain political relevance.88  Despite the bitter lessons of two decades of turmoil 
directly traceable to this proclivity, the dangerous tendency may not have changed 
much.  This is clearly one of the main challenges Cote d’Ivoire faces in the period 
leading up to the next election.  Already, in Cote d’Ivoire, another concept, that of 
“rattrapage éthnique” presented by its critics, as smacking of Ivoirité, in reverse for 
northerners and its supporters as a needed affirmative action remedy to rampant 
Ivoirité, which for years deprived northerners from equal opportunity.  Another, 
which was one of the contentious issues before and during the 2010-2011 crisis is 
the composition and attributions of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI).  
The latest compromise on its composition has been rejected by the FPI, which will 
doubtless hamper effort to hold peaceful and transparent presidential elections in 
2015.   
 
A critical dimension of the state building process breakdown that Cote d’Ivoire has 
experience, but which has not been scrutinised enough is the concentration of 
power in the office of the president.  This institutional flaw that allowed President 
Houphouet-Boigny to rule the country as a “presidential monarch” for more than 
thirty year is, in part, what makes this function so attractive.  It enables a president 
to carry out his most outlandish whims without any institutional break of the 
tendency of power to corrupt.  This concentration of powers within the presidency 
was inherited from the French Fifth Republic institutional arrangements, which 
aimed to remedy the dysfunctions of the French Fourth Republic’s parliamentary 
system, and uncritically adopted for the fledgling new Ivoirian state in 1960.  Other 
aspects of the constitution, particularly the articles on citizenship and eligibility to 
run for the office of president, even succession in the office (for example) have been 
rightly the subject of permanent, contentious conversations, and were more or less 
judiciously altered.  Oddly, the issue of exorbitant powers in the hands of one man in 
the context of weak institutions, singularly those supposed to balance the Executive, 
poorly educated populations, and an embattled civil society has been mostly 
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ignored.  There seems to have been no noticeable efforts to visit this concentration 
of powers as part of the conversation on state building and democratisation.  This is 
likely to remain an issue that needs to be addressed in any serious conflict 
prevention and state building conversation in the future.   
 
Tentative conclusion   
 
Cote d’Ivoire’s post electoral crisis conversations on peace building and broader 
state building are only in their 3rd year, which means that any overall conclusion on 
its direction and lessons can only be tentative.  Though violence persists in various 
forms and the culture of violence has not disappeared, the resolution of the post 
electoral stalemate did contribute to reduce it and offer an opportunity to overhaul 
and reinvigorate peace building.  Of course, the state building adventure is much 
older and a few patterns can be discerned.   Therefore, some conclusions in the form 
of propositions can be teased out about these processes in a number of areas the 
foregoing analysis has identified as critical.  These themes are at the heart of the 
crisis of state building in Cote d’Ivoire.  They include gender, the role and place of 
civil society, that of the elites, their interests and identity fixations as drivers of 
conflict.  They also include the role and place of the security sector, and how it can 
enhance peace consolidation and state building, the uncritical adoption and 
perpetuation of the colonial state model and elections as a panacea, for violence and 
tensions. Finally, the impact of the extreme concentration of powers in the 
presidency and the long-term involvement of external actors in the processes are 
equally important to consider to fully understand the peace building and state 
building endeavour saga in Cote d’Ivoire.  
 
Propositions for Field Research 
For this study to answer precisely the central research question and its ancillary 
questions, the following propositions, derived from the insights this baseline study 




Proposition # 1: Gender: The post electoral crisis seems to have revealed 
that a large number of victims were women and girls: to what extend has this 
factor affected the conversations? Has a seemingly heightened awareness of 
gender dimensions of conflict, peace building and state building translated 
into more gender guided conversations and policies?  Or, conversely, has the 
sidelining of the voice of women and other gender issues continued?   
 
Proposition # 2: Civil society’s actual role in the conversations. Though it 
has participated at various levels in generating/fuelling the crisis and later in 
searching for solutions, by and large, civil society has not been given a 
prominent place in state building and peace building processes. What effect 
has this marginalisation had on these processes? Has the role of Ivoirian civil 
society been fully mapped and critically evaluated to better assign it more 
prominent and more constructive role?  
 
Proposition # 3: State building and peace building (and conflict making) 
have been almost exclusively controlled and conducted by Ivoirian political, 
intellectual and business elites and have mostly profited them to the 
detriment of ordinary Ivoirians.  What mechanisms and safeguards need to 
be in place to make conflict unprofitable to the elites?   
 
Proposition # 4: State building and peace building have been marred by 
violence by state security institutions as well as non-state security actors.  To 
what extent did the dysfunctions of the security sector of Cote d’Ivoire (and 
their neglect) contribute to the breakdown? What could have been done to 
better integrate Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the peace agreements?  Have 
the reforms being carried so far contributed to transforming the role and 
place of security institutions to make them supportive of peace building and 




Proposition # 5: The Westphalian model and colonial state model have been 
the unquestioned models for state building in Cote d’Ivoire (as elsewhere in 
Africa). To what extent have these models been critically re-examined in light 
of the failures witnessed over the last fifty years, and what alternatives can 
be considered?  
 
Proposition # 6: Throughout the peace building phase and since the 1990s, 
elections have been fetishized as the cure-all to the crisis of development, 
state building, and of violent political conflict.  To what extent did this focus 
on elections and their mechanics with the aim of holding “free and fair 
elections” contribute to exacerbate conflict instead, and complicate peace 
building and state building processes?   
 
Proposition # 7: Peace building and state building efforts have not tackled 
the issue of the exorbitant powers concentrated in the executive and the 
need for more power balance between the other branches of government 
and even civil society.  Assuming the overall institutional arrangement 
existing in the current constitution will remain, do Ivoirian see this oversight 
as a significant source of conflict, and do they consider a better balance 
between branches likely to curb the ambition among leading elites to want to 
be president at all cost?   
 
Proposition # 8: Cote d’Ivoire’s peace building process has been marked by 
the continued involvement of external actors (individuals, states, regional 
and international organisations).  What assessment can be done of these 
actors? In the end, have they helped or harmed the peace building and 
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